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In this paper I elaborate on the argument that 'the mfecane' is a
pivotal component of a 'liberal1, settler, apartheid-skeletal form a new
analysis- The main assertion of mfecane propaganda is that a
'Zulu-centric' revolution produced an extensive depopulation which
explains in historiographical sequence: the f1ight of peoples into the
'liberation' of the European economy, the land division of 1913, and,
since the 1950s, the configuration of the Bantustans. In reply, it is
shown that the sub-continental destabilisations and transformations
within black societies sprang from the synchronous and converging impact
of European penetration at Delagoa Bay, the Cape, north of the Orange,
and Natal. In order to disguise what had occurred the whites erased
themselves from their own impact, and retrospectively inserted Shaka and
other victims of the process as initiators in situations where they were
absent. The chronology is lengthened far beyond the (in this context)
irrelevant reign of the Zulu monarch. Particular attention is paid to
the sequences of this extended chronology and to the cross-interactions
between the sectors of the white advance. It is not the intention to
minimise change internal to black societies, but rather to make a call
for this to be researched in its proper context. The huge gaps in our
knowledge revealed by this approach ensure that this task is a
formidable one.
Where we are and how we got there
The basic propositions of mfecane propaganda are blissfully simple (a
necessary attribute of myth: see Barthes). The 1980s version - a
product of the refinements of Oner-Cooper and The Oxford^ History - has
an 'explosion' amongst the northern 'Nguni1 triggered by overpopulation
which (somehow) led to the hegemony of the Zulu 'empire' of Shaka. This
uniquely revolutionary and predatory state depopulated Natal and forced
neighbours in flight into the interior where they set up 'shock waves'
(the semiology of mfecane literature would repay a study) over half of
Africa. The instantly hZulu-ised' Ndebele depopulated the Transvaal
before being chased (by the Zulu) into Zimbabwe. Fleeing Dlamini groups
formed Swaziland in the eastern escarpment. Gaza and Jere refugees from
Shaka devastated the Delagoa Bay area (or perhaps the Zulu did), the
Jere, i.e. the Ngoni, creating a Zulu-inspired havoc as far as Lake
Nyanza. The equally Zulu-ised Ngwane of Matiwane marauded into the
Caledon and 'set into motion1 the Tlokwa, that is Mantatees of MaNtatisi
who, briefly Zulu-ised herself (though only for three years) depopulated
the Orange Free State, and - either the Tlokwa or tertiary victims in
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the chain reaction such as Sebetwane's Kololo: there is no unanimity -
were only thrown back from an attempted invasion of the Cape Colony at
the heroic battle of Dithakong in 1823. In the Caledon Moshoeshoe
gathered exhausted survivors and began to form Basutoland, an island of
security in the Zulu-inspire holocaust. The Ngwane meanwhile met
nemesis when their next proposed victims, the Tembu, called in a British
commando to their rescue (Mbolompo: 1828). Survivors of perhaps 720,000
(sic) peoples fleeing Shaka through and out of Natal found only brief
respite amongst the Gcaleka of Hintsa before succumbing to new
persecution. This necessitated the British 'rescuing them from bondage'
in the 'war' of 1835. These Fingos, transformed by their misfortunes,
became at once 'the Jews of Kaffirland1, immediately receptive to
labour, Christianity, profit and life as peasant farmers. Fortunately
this holocaust (nearly two million dead) died down as quickly (and
mysteriously) as it began. In the 1830s the whites were able to move
into empty areas, survey the bleached bones in the veld, wean the
cannibals from their habit, and provide a rallying point for the
survivors. These, nevertheless, remained in the peripheral areas
(shaped rather like a horseshoe) - desert, mountains, low-veld - which
provided the original delineation of the later Bantustans.
To laugh or not to laugh? Students are never quite sure; but the
lecturer's cue invariably turns them straight-faced to their notes and
exams. It is true that heavy camouflage conceals the blood-line of this
nonsense. Still, how astonishing that it was not questioned before the
early 1980s? The exaggerated teleology and Afrocentricism are
noticeable, as are the pluralistic separation off of black from white
history (to remedy this would justify a year's moratorium in our history
examinations), the whites as incidental and innocent by-standers, and
the over-happy coincidence of the depeopling of Natal, the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal immediately prior to the white occupation. A
colossal, self-induced Auseinandersetzung a split-second before the
whites arrive; as soon as eyewitnesses appear everything is quiet! A
few writers, notably Dora Taylor, Hosiah Jaffe and, more recently,
Marianne Cornevin, have shown how aspects of this legitimate apartheid.
These texts, however, have not been taken seriously by the Universities.
(My own course was unanimously axed when it was seen where my thoughts
were going.) Moreover, nobody has yet questioned the mfecane as total
concept. Modern Ph.D. students concentrate on 'manageable', i.e.
non-controversial issues. A law not unlike that at work at Chernobyl
has led, in short, to disaster. A far-reaching inquest is necessary.
The 'perfection' of our mfecane is the product of much accretion, honing
and purifying: but the main pillars of the mythology were in place by
the 1830s. By then the literature was already heavily contaminated with
fantastical descriptions and fictions composed by settler propagandists
such as Fynn, Chase and Godlonton. (The style was typical of the
period, but has only been exposed by Curt in in the west African
context.) Behind this ' proto-mfecane' lay the needs to obfuscate the
Cape's labour procurement strategies in the years after the arrival of
the 1820 settlers, and to depict Natal as depopulated so as to encourage
a northern extension of colonisation. The first produced the myths of
the Mantatee and Fetcani 'hordes'; the second the fantasy of Shaka and
the equally 'horde-ish' Zulu. Mystifications about the 'gyrations' and
self-inflieted damage of the Mantatees swelled in ratio to the growing
amnesia about the slave trade north of the Orange in the early 1820s.
The subsequent switch in 1828 to a 'free1 labour strategy produced the
massacres of the Ngwane in the same year, condemnation of which was
drowned in the hypocrisies of Godlonton and his Graham's Town Journal.
White destabilizations south of the Tugela and almost certain
manipulation of the Zulu succession in 1828 intensified the anti-Shaka
campaign in the early 1830s. The unfortunate timing of a yet huger raid
on the Gcaleka for cattle and labour in 1834-5 - a year after Britain's
abolition of slavery - was to necessitate the even more ornate fictions
depicting Fingos as victims of the Shaka terror. In this manner the two
originally separate sources of the mythology were fused. Most
incredibly of all, the Mantatee 'horde' was - also in the mid-l830s -
elided with the harmless and inconspicuous 'MaNtatisi' , the mother of
the Tlokwas leader, Sekonyela, an elision additionally connected to a
local Caledon valley propaganda campaign of the British-backed
Moshoeshoe against the 'villainous' Sekonyela, his regional rival.
In the half century before 1910 there was a tension between attempts at
a pan-South African mythology, and the particularistic local propagandas
of the Cape, Natal and, growingly after 1868, Basutoland, a tension
which mimicked the pushmipullu-like political tendencies of the era.
The Cape after 'Responsible Government' concentrated on embellishing the
story of the Fingos (this reached an apotheosis in Whiteside's History
of the AmaMbo in 1912) and of drawing lurid portraits of Matiwane.
Mbolompo and 'the rescue of the Fingos' became founding battles of
Hastings for the lack of anything more appropriate. The 1840s settlers
in Natal took up the Zulu mythology. A crescendo of anti-Zulu
denunciation occurred to cover the land seizures, hut taxation and
chibaro labour systems of the 1840s and 1850s; the attack on Cetshwayo's
kingdom in 1879; and the seizure of land within Zululand itself after
1897. Cetshwayo was sedulously cloaked in the myth of Shaka; perhaps
more importnatly Shaka was attributed with the armies of Cetshwayo and
Barnbata. The myths reverberated back and forth across the decades,
producing an analytical timelessness detectable in the traditions of
James Stuart, whose informants speak with ventriloqual voice. After
Bryant had further worked on this it was difficult not to see the whole
tree of South African history as predestined in the acorn that was
Dingiswayo. Myth crystalised not merely around the least known men (and
women) but sprouted most luxuriantly in those geographical regions which
were the last to be explored by Europeans. Encouraged thus, Ellenberger
- in the same era as Stuart and Whiteside - staged his 'lifaqane' in the
unknown Caledon of the 1820s: an alleged bloodbath between - precisely -
1820 and 1833 organised by Mzilikazi, Matiwane, MaNtatisi and ' the
cannibals'. In Ellenberger the hagiography of Moshoeshoe begun by the
French missionaries in the 1830s reached a peroration. Black chiefs
everywhere were thus sorted into 'heroes' or 'villains', as they had
served, or not, white expansionism.
G.M. Theal was mainly responsible for amalgamating the sectorial myths
to produce a pan-South African history that pre-annexed the Boer
Republics and was the ideological facet of the drive for Union. Theal
sculpted even more extraordinary versions on which the text-books are
still inexcusably but logically based. Extra stress was placed on
Mzilikasi's 'depopulation' of the Transvaal. The central chain-reaction
of ' the mfecane' : Zulu attack Hlubi/Ngwane, who attack Tlokwa (i.e.
Mantatees), who expel Kololo, some of whom career on to Dithakong, is
now (1880s) invented. A Zulu-inspired self-genocide of blacks put into
'correct perspective1 any damage the whites might have caused. The
magisterial pronouncements of Theal and Cory echo around the
deliberations of the Lagden Commission as they help themselves to 93% of
land in the Union. Maps produced by Theal' s main heir, E. A. Walker,
splashed hatenured lines into the central Transkei and Bechuanaland
depicting yet greater swathes of depopulation. In 1928 only did Walker
coin the neologism mfecane (the italicisation an additional disguise) to
denote the total process; his translation, 'the crushing', despite
pathological repetition in the text-books, has no legitimacy. The
appearance of the Fynn 'Diary' in 1950 and of the largely fictional
Shaka Zulu by Ritter established Shaka's world popular reputation,
whilst Omer-Cooper's Zulu Aftermath in 1966 improbably established 'the
mfecane' as a centre-piece of the new 'Africanist' history. The Oxford
History (1969) injected all this into academic arteries world-wide in
the early 1970s, as a comparison of text-books of that era with those of
the 1950s will show. The further simplification and caricature of these
versions by television and cinema, and by writers of South Africa's
school text-books has probably ensured that this mfecane/Shaka is
semiologically ineradicable this side of a revolution in our educational
system. The failure to see the links between 'the mfecane' of the past
twenty years and Verwoerd, Vorster and Both's Bantustan strategies -
despite its presence on the election platforms of the far right - is not
the least of the items on the agenda of self-criticism for the
contemporary historical profession.
Interlude
My attempts to teach 'the mfecane1 in 1982 (as an optional third year
course, paralleling the compulsary South African course!) turned into a
determination to dig up by the roots and expose the very object of
instruction. I was confronted with an ever lengthening list of errors,
omissions of all too easily accessible evidence, and an equally
inexhaustible list of fictional insertions and false ascriptions.
Wherever I looked - in 'Natal' , the trans-Mkuzi, or the Caledon - the
Zulu presence vanished altogether or needed to be rewritten in its
correct scale and circumstance. Stuart's informants continually
contradicted his assumptions of a depopulated Natal. No explanation
existed for the first move of the Ndebele; whilst their subsequent
propulsion north was arranged by the Griquas and the Boers. Nothing
reliable existed in explanation of any of the Ngwane movements. The
Tlokwas had never been reported out of the upper Caledon. A fog of
hypocritical mystification surrounded the 'battle' of Dithakong. There
was a conspiracy of silence as to the events of 1828 and 1835. The
circumstances of the 1828 events at both ends of the Transkei had been
shredded, whilst the stories of D'Urban's military of huge migrations
through the Transkei seemed a more than convenient alibi for
labour-hungry conquerors. There was a resonant silence as to Portuguese
slaving at the Bay: indeed, southern Mozambique had been snipped out of
South African history altogether. Repeatedly there had been a
'levelling up', so that spear was depicted as more decisive than the
rifle, minor skirmishes between black groups as dwarfing Austerlitz,
Borodino and 'the mfecane' as a whole approximately equal in scale to
the Napoleonic Wars. Settler propaganda had had a century and a half in
which to manipulate, forget and rearrange the facts. The sacred texts
of Ellenberger and Bryant contained no coherent histories at all, merely
a bombardment of suggestion, confusingly over-complex detail,
patronising pronouncements, chronological inversions, hundredfold
increases or diminutions in scale, credulous speculation dressed up and
accepted as expertise, the repeated resort to fiction when the threads
of evidence ran out (or were tactfully discarded), and, throughout, the
most repellant and racist self-glorification. Nothing of any of this
had been challenged. Stories however surreal, however absurd, had been
humourlessly repeated by the most respected historians right the way to
the present.
The trouble ahead was illuminated by my failure to answer the first
question: what was 'the mfecane' ? It was, for example, impossible to
delimit chronologically. Confusion as to the termination sent me in hot
pursuit across the borders of South African history 'proper1, a
territory where my questions were not welcomed. Did the Mbolompo
campaign, the 'frontier war' of 1834-5 or the Zulu war of 1879 belong to
the course on the mfecane or the one on 'South African history1?
Attempts at arbitration evaded the real problem, the untenability of
separating the material into two courses in the first place. As for the
mfecane's initiation and causation, the literature was in spectacular
disarray. The fragile attempts of Guy and Hall to provide substance to
the somewhat desperate hypothesis of overpopulation revealed on the
contrary its untenability. The nearly complete vacuum in knowledge
about Shaka and his Zulu had switched attention back to Zwide in the
1790s, and away from the Mfolosi as 'storm centre1 to the Pongola. But
Zwide's Ndwandwe were even more of a blank. Hedges attempted to replace
the argument about excess population with one that attributed the
initiation of structural revolution to the supplying of American whalers
at Delagoa Bay with cattle in the 1790s. This seemed equally
unsatisfactory. Moreover, this sort of hypothesis formed a different
species of explanation which exploded the subject of explanation. How
could an 'internal revolution' that was isolatedly integral to black
societies have been caused by exogamous impacts? Even the military
revolution evaporated on close inspection, or, rather, Omer-Cooper's
version did. The ibutho long predated the 1790s. That it may well have
been readapted to hunt elephants, cattle (and people?), as Hedges,
argued very plausibly, begged a chain of questions. Assumptions about
the short stabbing spear and 'horns and chests' tactics were amusing.
The fixation with the 'Nguni' was a projection back of twentieth-century
tribe-manufacture. Surely 'Tsonga' and 'Sotho' societies had also
experienced dramatic change? Were the 'Nguni1 predators and everyone
else victims? My conclusion that Mzilikazi's Ndebele and Moshoeshoe1s
'Sotho1 kingdoms were sister formations had been anticipated by
Macmillan. If one brought in the 'bastard' states, the Taung, the Xhosa
bands, the raiders of Coenrad de Buys, and the constellations built up
by Fynn and Farewell in southern Natal, not only the concept of 'tribe',
but even that of 'race' became redundant. Uncoincidentally, this ran up
against another of the litanies of the 'liberal' world view.
Hedges had advanced to the brink of shattering the mfecane without
realising it. My own 'swingeing' onslaught was handicapped by an
initial failure to provide a coherent overview of events that had, at
least some of them, all too clearly occurred. The mfecane was peppered
with buckshot, but it still lived. The missing bones which permitted a
fuJ 1 restructuring of the skeleton of the real animal that had stalked
the sub-continent were supplied by Harries who in 1981 (as spin-off from
his Ph.D. thesis!) produced incontrovertible evidence of a flourishing
slave trade at Delagoa Bay in the first half of the nineteenth century.
It was now possible to explain an exodus of peoples in all directions
from an epicentre neither on the Mfolosi nor the Pongola, but further
north to the west of the Bay. It was immaterial whether this trade had
taken off after 1815 or whether it had existed (at a lower level
perhaps: we need research) in the eighteenth century. Either way,
decisive additional weight was given to Hedge's hypotheses concerning
the transformatory impact of the ivory and cattle trades. The
intensification of regional violence after 1815 was now explanable. the
devious need to resort to the (in fact hypothetical) coming to power of
Shaka ' in 1816' fell away. Peoples such as the Ngwane and the Ndebele
were likely to have been expelled from the south-west Bay hinterland by
the slave trade, just as peoples to the north were. But, in the
southern sector their flight drove them straight into the guns of the
Griqua and, later, Boers operating out of the Cape Colony. It was this
double pinning, or the simultaneity of antipodal pressures which
distinguished southern Africa. Both of the slave trades, as well as the
upheavals north of the Bay had been removed from history by settler
propaganda, and Shaka ubiquitously inserted as explanation. The result,
'the mfecane', was a contrived illusion of the literature, the negation
of 'events on the ground'.
It was this juxtaposition which accounts for the fact that an
unparalleled pattern of dislocation occurred in proximity to and, in
part, as consequence of the relatively weak (as compared to central
Mozambique or west Africa) slave trade at the Bay. Put the other way,
the specific combination of events was driven dominantly by the settler
presence: without this, black reactions to the local slave trade would
have reassembled - perhaps at an equivalently weaker level - the
sequences along the Zambezi and the Rufiji. As explained later, the
short initial moves of both Ndebele and Ngwane support this conclusion.
The black experience is southern Africa _is, thus, quite different from
elsewhere in Africa, and the nature of the changes within their social
formations has a specific flavour. Nevertheless, such a peculiar and
complex series of interactions was then thrown comprehensively out of
focus by settler writing ('the mfecane'). This misdescription of the
1830s and 1840s has, as mentioned, parallels too in other parts of
Africa. 'Normally1 - if South African had been decolonized after 1945 -
a return to history would have been effected long ago. Equally without
parallel (perhaps in world history), however, is the perpetuation of
these early sleights of hand and literary habits into the present era of
the cinema, the television and the paperback; and the readaptation of
mythologies which served one group of purposes before 1850 and then
around 1900 to new objectives of concealment in the late twentieth
century.
To Return To History
Extricating ourselves from the quicksands of the Cape-Natal propaganda,
we must gain height for a subcontinental view. Observing this with one
eye, we must fly higher yet and inspect the human world as a whole, and
over a much longer time-span. We have to concentrate on the two
processes at the same time, that in western Europe, 'big1 and 'quick',
the other beneath us, 'small1 and 'slow'. And while one eye is fixed on
each, a third must measure the accelerating convergence and impact.
Ridding ourselves of assumptions of 'merrie Africa' (whilst reserving
the right to be uneasy about where the now united process is going), and
concentrating on choosing the words with nuances which will offend the
least part of the audience; with a final check on our backgrounds,
prejudices and dreams, we can extricate the spare sixth hand and begin.
Out of feudalism in western Europe emerged capitalism, in the first
phase of which the Portuguese and Spanish 'discovered' America, rounded
Africa, and began to harvest the former with the labour of the latter.
The fruits returned to Europe to generate new technologies, trades, an
obsession with profit, upheavals in 'world view', population explosion,
and, sadly, a new era of ever heightening warfare. This phase of
trading/slaving-based, or plunder-based 'mercantile' capitalism produced
titanic struggles between new 'nations', the most strategically
fortunate and politically innovative of which, England - taking
Portugual under a quasi-protection (1654; 1703) and making the Dutch
junior partners (1625-1713), took on the French and by 1800 were half
way to achieving a world empire. Utilising slave labour in the
Americas, and revolutionising land tenure at home, investing the profit
from the former and juxtaposing it with the internal labour released by
the latter, the British began to industrialise a generation ahead of her
rivals. Seeking markets for her depression prone cotton and wool
industries, naval hegemony against the French, and 'temperate1 lands in
which to settle a perceived (and indeed for a time actual) surplus
population - in short lebensraum - the British moved into amongst other
places southern Africa (1806), taking the already present Dutch into a
frictioned tutelage.
On the ground beneath us some very interesting 'interactions' have
already been occurring - and will now intensify - on several
simultaneous fronts. Around Delagoa Bay, firstly, Portuguese, British,
'Austrian1, American and French traders have already by 1800 had a
considerable impact on local 'Tsonga', 'Sotho' and 'Olentont' societies.
Cloth, beads, brass and guns are going in, ivory, cattle, ambergris,
gold etc. are going out. There is some uncertainty - c.1800 - whether
yet substantial numbers of slaves are being exported; but in view of the
sporadic references to an eighteenth-century trade and of the lateness
of our being informed of the very substantial trade after c.1810 we are
checking the evidence very carefully. Following Hedges, we can see that
interrelationships between states are powerfully affected by these
trades. Conflict between Mabudu, Tembe and Mattolla is intensified.
Ndwandwe and her satelites reorientate themselves to the trade. Further
south an Mthethwa-Mabudu coastal alliance is split into two by the
west-south-east axis of Ndwandwe and allies. A glance north of the Bay,
however, indicates that trends in state formation and a heightening of
violence are not confined to the south. Throughout the region older
intra-African trade routes are captured by the new dominant ones ending
at the sea. Peoples as far apart as the Pungwe, the Kei and the Molopo
are brought within one huge trading network. But all this is
unexceptional. It resembles, mutatis mutandis, similar experiences of
8west African societies in the same era. We have merely lacked a Cur tin
to chronicle it.
To the south-west, secondly - and here we come to the 'specificity' of
southern Africa - are the Dutch who find no counterpart in west Africa.
Between the 1650s and the arrival of the British the Dutch had spread
out and settled the land. They brought new diseases, began the task of
exterminating the San and Khoi, and interacted with the Mozambique coast
by importing slaves, and even for a time establishing a trading company
at the Bay (1720s). 'Miscegenation' produced Christianised, gun-armed,
horse-riding 'Bastards', who moved into the interior seeking more land,
subsumed Khoi groups along the Orange - such as the Kora -, trading,
raiding - a reach which extended well beyond the Limpopo by the 1790s.
(Overland contacts with the Bay cannot be ruled out.) Remarkable and
very powerful 'commando states' emerged, such as that of Klaas
Afrikaaner - which require detailed research. The trading-raiding for
ivory, cattle and, increasingly slaves - mostly San until the 1810s -
had a comparable and simultaneous impact in transorangia1 as the
trading/slaving in the Bay hinterland. Legassick notes that
Moleabangwe's Tlhaping had been 'revolutionised' by about 1810 (a
comparison between them and Makhasane's Mabudu or Dingiswayo's Mthethwa
might be revealing). These considerations too should wean us from our
fixation with the Mfolosi.
The Dutch, in the third sector, had additionally penetrated east, making
contact with 'Xhosa1 groups such as the Gqunukhwebe the Ndlambe and
Rharhabe (='Gaikas') east of the Gamtoos. Trade links were established
with the Gcaleka east of the Kei (who also received goods from the Bay).
Inevitably there were struggles of slowly mounting intensity over land
and cattle. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries these
fairly balanced interactions ('frontier wars' 1-3) were dramatically
upset by the supercession of Boer rule by that of the British, who
brought with them the world's most modern weaponry and a 'total
strategy1 new to Africa. Both the Khoi and the Xhosa worlds fell apart.
In 1809-12 the British enserfed the Khoi and began a genocidal campaign
to force Bantu groups east of the Fish in order to seize their land.
The first relocations over a huge area in South Africa's history were
achieved with a depth of brutality only recently revealed by Maclennan.
This 'fourth Frontier War' of 1811-12 began the process of land
attenuation and 'Fingoisation'. To speak of •frontier wars' is
deceptive (the euphemism is a favourite one of Cape historians): it was
an unending series of attacks, pressures, subversions, 'treaties1,
robberies, cattle seizures, proselytizations, betrayals,
misrepresentations, and restructuring. The European God and value
system, monagamy, and clothing (to uplift the people of Lancashire and
Yorkshire) were forcibly introduced, land, labour and cattle seized in
return. Settler propagandists sedulously minimised the comparative
scale of this horror (as compared to the mostly imaginary Zulu
'upheavals'), and encapsulated it off both geographically and textually
from relevant events elsewhere in the subcontinent. The near conceptual
impossibility of mentally connecting these events of c. 1810-20 with the
contemporary careers of Dingiswayo and Shaka is a significant triumph of
settler historiographical suggestion.
Between about 1815 and 1840 there occurred both a growing convergence
and interpenetration between the three sectors of the European advance
(as well as the opening up of a fourth between the Mzimkhulu and the
Tugela), and a mounting intensity of violence, as Europeans seized land
in the south, and labour in each of the sectors - destined either for
the Cape farms or the sugar plantations of Brazil, Reunion etc. This
led to a subcontinental-wide crisis for black and 'Khoisan1 peoples
which is not remotely comparable to anything that had gone before. No
statement of this appears in any text book of South African history (or
monograph for that matter). The Bay slave trade was only detected in
1981. And the slaving north of the Orange was only clarified in outline
in my own article due later this year (1988) . It is the least of
coincidences that these years are precisely the years of 'the mfecane'.
In the Cape after about 1810 enserfment of the Khoi, and Griqua raids
for San never came near to solving a chronic labour shortage. The
British ban on the slave trade, the ban on the utilisation of 'kaffir'
labour, the intrinsic sparcity of Khoi labour and the impossibility of
policing a huge region ensured that the large batches of British
settlers arriving from the unhappy Britain of Lord Liverpool had no
legal means of obtaining sufficient labour - an unpropitious fact for
the farming and defending an easterly creeping march. With the
compliance of the Governor the settlers and Boers arranged with Griqua
and 'frontier ruffians' to supply them with Tswana and Sotho (i.e.
black) labour from north of the Orange. This doubly illegal supply
necessitated the extensive use of euphemisms and lies: the mainly women
and children brought south by force were labelled 'Mantatees' coming 'in
search of refuge1 from an auto-violence organised by their own chiefs!
The 'battle' of Dithakong was merely one such raid (in fact on Kwena and
Hurutshe) for slaves and cattle, unusual only in the extensive evidence
left by the missionary leaders. The early and mid 1820s thus certainly
saw extensive destabilisations in the region north of the Orange: but
the roots of the violence and of the accompanying hunger lay in the
south, not in the 'Zulu' east. The flow of violence was from south-west
to north-east. The Taung emerged as a predator state - alongside the
Bergenaars, Koranna and Griqua - in the northern Orange Free State: it
was almost certainly a combination of Taung and Bergenaars which forced
the Patsa-Kololo north sometime before 1824. Peoples fled in all
directions, enlarging the Tlhaping and Taung, as well as Moshoeshoe's
growing state east of the Caledon, and Mzilikazi's on the upper Vaal.
Others sought their stolen children in the Cape, ending up as labourers
themselves. The ripples of settler invasions thus had far-reaching
effects on black societies not only east of the Gamtoos, but north of
the Orange, even of the Vaal. It is artificial to speak of distinct
'northern' and 'eastern' frontiers: the Caledon and Kei regions were
fused into one interconnected theatre by criss-crossing raiding bands
and fleeing peoples. Xhosa bandits raided north, while groups such as
the Ngwane fled from the Bergenaars south of the Orange, when they were
immediately characterised by the propaganda of the British and Tembu as
a new 'Fetcani Horde'. As the Mantatees before them, the Fetcani became
the target of British raiding - the Ngwane being massacred in the very
month of Ordinance 49 (July 1828), which, in response to continuing
labour shortages, further expansion east of the Fish, and the imminence
of the ending of slavery, permitted the utilisation of 'free' black
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labour for the first time. Mutiliated Ngwane prisoners taken in the
raid at Mbolompo became the first 'kaffir' labourers to respond to the
'invitation1. Soon they were subsumed under the more versatile
euphemism 'Fingo'. Ingeniously, settler propaganda attributed the
regional violence to the Mantatees and Fetcani themselves, a mendacious
displacement that converted the captives into Untermenschen, the lucky
recipients of British humanitarian attention. Dithakong and Mbolompo
became heroic vindications of the new order.
Paralleling the labour-raiding in the Colony was a coterminous
escalation of the slave trade at Delagoa Bay and Inhambane. This badly
needs a detailed study, but the following points may be stressed. After
1815 an extra demand for sugar in Europe with an accompanying rise in
slave prices, an increasing activity of Brazilian and United States
slavers, and British attempts to keep Portugual from slaving north of
the equator (treaties of 1815 and 1817) produced a convergence on,
amongst other ports, Delagoa Bay. By 1821-22 both Gaza and Mthethwa
were present around the Bay, the former at least trading slaves to the
Portuguese fort. Tembe, Mabudu and Mattolla were all involved in the
trade. By the later 1820s at least 3,000 slaves - mostly men in this
case - were being exported annually from both the Bay and Inhambane:
this is only the detected number of declared slaves. The slaves were
exported to Reunion, Rio de Janeiro, Havane, Buenos Aires and
innumberable other destinations. These numbers persisted into the 1830s
and 1840s, before declining in the 1850s - when exports switched to the
Boer farms in the Transvaal. However the figures are read a very high
percentage of males were being seized in the 'Delagoa Bay Hinterland', a
fact overlooked by every theorist of the mfecane's causation.
It is not yet known where the slaves were taken from. An army of black
musketeers with Portuguese officers existed at Lourenco Marques for the
seizure of slaves; but the details of their activities are missing.
Local 'tribal1 warfare in the hinterland was virtually certainly
excacerbated by the market. Fynn in one of his earlier and more
plausible essays indicates that both the Ndwandwe and Zulu sold their
prisoners into slavery. It raises the question discussed by Curtin for
Senegambia to what extent slave supply came from 'normal' wars, or was
fed by raiders stimulated into business by the commercial propsects.
Inexplicably Hedges fails to mention slavery at all, although his
arguments for the impact merely of the ivory and cattle trades - which
also intensified during the 1820s - would have been immeasurably
strengthened. What seems certain is the dominance of 'Tsonga' and
Ndwandwe-linked groups in the trade. There is absolutely no evidence of
a Zulu hegemony in the Bay area in the early 1820s, or at any time for
that matter. The allegations to this effect were inserted backwards by
writers (or their ghosts) such as W.F.W Owen in the 1830s: their
contemporary accounts of 1823-25 contain no such references. Tshopi
groups north of the Bay were among the victims. But there are
indications that peoples of the Nkomati, Mbelezi, Usuthu, Ingwavuma,
Pongola and perhaps Mfolozi valleys were attacked. The heightening of
tension in the subregion can only be explained in this context. The
otherwise inexplicable collapse and dispersal of Ndwandwe itself must
surely be seen in this light. Whether Zwide himself was a slaver
supremo must remain an open question. The mechanics of the triangula
struggle between Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and Mabudu at the turn of the 1820s
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need studying, but, given the background, it is unlikely that issues of
slaving will be absent. Whether the Ndwandwe-1inked Gaza and Ngoni
(Jere) were slaver states and moved into the Bay region attracted by new
business opportunities must also for the moment remain hypothesis,
although the absence of evidence for a Zulu role in these northerly
movements should be noted. On the contrary, the Zulu movements were to
the south. Whether the subsequent slaving careers of Ngoni groups
beyond the Save and Zambezi were a logical continuation of their earlier
experiences should also be researched. At the least the absurd
assumption of 'mfecane theory' that the Ngoni migrations were impelled
by atavistic Zuluism, or even of Zulu attacks, should be discarded. A
last question (for now) is whether the slavery-connected migrations of
'Tsonga' peoples away from the Bay, up the Olifants, Letaba and Levubu
valleys that Harries describes for the 1830s - when the slave trade
reached a peak - can be antedated to the 1820s or even 1810s. Answers
to these and many other questions are blocked by our present lack of
evidence. But at least a search within a promising framework can be
begun.
Turning to the comparable cases of the Ndebele (or Khumalo) and the
Ngwane: it is obviously significant that contemporary writers connected
the 'upheavals1 in the Pongola region with the Bay slave trade. In the
1820s Macmillan repeated Dr Philip's observation of 1828 that the
Khumalo had been evicted by slavers. The Ndebele, on the upper Pongola,
and the Ngwane, about thirty miles south-west on the upper Mzinyathi,
were not only both well sited for attacks by slavers, but are both known
to have been attacked by the slaver Ndwandwe - and in the more
knowledgeable accounts are depicted as having been expelled by the
Ndwandwe. The Ngwane were also attacked by the Mthethwa (the precise
sequence of these attacks is shadowy, but probably not relevant here)
who had an alliance with the slaver state of Mabudu, borrowed
Makhasane's musketeers, and are known to have been near Lourenco Marques
in 1821. Conversely, the evidence for Zulu attacks is non existent, at
least for the period before 1830. In both cases there is otherwise a
blank in place of an explanation, a blank that I ran into when studying
the Ndebele in the 1970s. I therefore repeat the argument in my recent
paper, ' Mfecane as Alibi' , that both the Ndebele and the Ngwane were
expelled wither by primary or secondary slave raiders, and that the
timing of these events is attributable to the rapidly rising export
demand at the Bay in the years c. 1816-21 and not to the activities of
the African Napoleon.
It is also crucial to understand, to return to an earlier point, that
the initial moves of both peoples were short - in the Ngwane case about
fifty or sixty miles south-west into the upper Wilge, the Ndebele about
seventy miles north-west to the east side of the headwaters of the Vaal
somewhere near modern Ermelo. (There was, it should be noted, no
Ndebele migration into the eastern Transvaal.) After further short
Ngwane moves from the Wilge into the upper Caledon, the gap between the
two groups had increased from about thirty to nearly two hundred miles,
a distance which was to make the difference between survival and
destruction. In an Africa wide context such flights from slavers were
'normal'. Even in the context of the eastern high-veld the incursions
of 'Nguni' from the east was unexceptional per se. What was exceptional
about these incursions of c. 1818-21 was the scale and the causation. A
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both the Ndebele and the Ngwane came under attack by the
Griqua/Bergenaar raiders operating out of the south-west and searching
for cattle and 'Mantatees' (i.e. slaves) for the settler farms. Both
Matiwane and Mzilikazi were thus caught in the crossfire of the two
inter-related plunder systems: both were caught and kept moving by a
second 'system'. Mzilikazi's people, about 400 miles/600ks from the
Griqua bases!, were in a more favourable position, but were nonetheless
severely harrassed in the mid 1820s by Griqua attentions. The exact
moment of the Ndebele migration out of the south-eastern Transvaal into
the western Transvaal is still open to question (some time between 1827
and 1833), but the Griqua causation is undisputed. The Khumalo state
expanded by the absorption of 'Sotho' and 'Tswana' refugees displaced in
the southern destabilisation - people fleeing the Taung and Bergenaars -
on the one hand, and 'Nguni' (e.g Ndwandwe) and possibly 'Tsonga1 groups
displaced like themselves in the eastern displacements on the other. It
was in these circumstances of a sequence of harrassments that the
peculiar evolution of Ndebele amabutho began. The Ngwane, conversely,
were by 1824 much more exposed to Griqua attacks where they had arrived
west of the upper Caledon - far more endangered than Moshoeshoe's more
propitiously sited Mokhoteli in the mountains east of the river.
Emulating the Ndebele in some respects, the Ngwane were shattered by
Griqua attacks in c. 1825-26. The following migration through the
north-eastern Cape into the southern Transkei - the only direction of
escape open - ended in a third disaster when they were massacred by the
British army in July and August 1828 in the immediate aftermath of the
sanctioning of 'free1 labour in Ordinance 49. The Ngwane were flung
helplessly between the three penetrative fronts of white activity. Both
the teleology and Afrocentricism of mfecane theory collapse.
With some of the ground cleared, it is safe, and chronologically
apposite to turn to the early Zulu. The general failure to probe the
fictions of Owen, King, Farewell, Fynn, Chase and Godlonton, and the
most uncritical use of Stuart and Bryant, has ensured that - with the
notable exception of Hamilton and Wright's recent studies - the analysis
of the pre-1840s Zulu kingdom is a disaster area. The first thing to
note is that what linked the three theatres of Delagoa Bay, 'Natal' and
the trans-Kei was not Shaka's impis but settler propaganda. Thwarted at
the Bay by the failure of the British Government to accept Owen's 'Tembe
Treaty' of 1823 (as well as by malaria), settlers landed at Port Natal
in 1824 and at once proclaimed: a recent Zulu devastation of the Mpondo;
a Zulu depopulation of Natal; and a land treaty granted by Shaka to the
area so generously depopulated. During 1825-27, as an aphrodisiac for
the scarcely interested Cape administration and merchant houses, a
vilification campaign was unleashed against Shaka and the Zulu. Every
exhortation, slander, deception and exaggeration was deployed in an
initially unsuccessful attempt to tempt Britain north. Zulu tyrany over
the Bay hinterland was also invented in case British chances in that
area took a turn for the better.
Not one of these charges stands up to examination. There was no
depopulation of Natal, no Zulu hegemony at the Bay, no 1824 land treaty,
and, virtually certainly, no Zulu attack on the Mpondoin 1824. Neither
was Shaka the monster depicted in the pages of Fynn and Isaacs. If
anything, the signs are that as a 'reactive' state (or 'defensive' state
to use the terminology of Wright and Hamilton) the Zulu were in the
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1820s as yet comparatively weak. The emergence of Zulu power after the
demise of Mthethwa (c. 1815-23) must be seen both in the context of the
slave trade and the opening of a second European front at Port Natal.
The first Zulu amalagamations occurred along the White Umfolosi.
Peoples along the Mkuzi and the upper Mzinyathi - such as Hlubi and
Ngwane, even Ndwandwe groups - fled into the growing state. The
1Ndwandwe-Zulu' fighting so precisely (and erroneously) dated to 1818-19
by Bryant (the repeating of Bryant's guessed datings is a sympton of the
literature) is 'a myth' - probably indicating not a sequence of specific
battles, but a reference to the generalised upheavals between the
Pongola and Mfolozi. (And what were the Ndwandwe doing when they
attacked south of the Mfolosi in '1818-19' and drove 'the zulu1 to the
Tugela?) In this regional struggle the Zulu-linked units were worsted
and at the turn of the 1820s the centre of the growing Zulu state
shifted south-east into Qwabe territory, leaving military units to the
north of the black Mfolosi in a defensive ring. From 1824 the Zulu,
like the Mabudu in the far north, received the aid of white gunmen, who
in 1826-7 enabled 'the Ndwande' to be attacked and Khumalo groups along
the Mfolosi forced to khonza. These 'victories' in fact merely indicate
the weakness and unexceptionality of the Shaka state until that date.
They were followed by a further shift of the Zulu centre southwards, the
capital itself moving south of the Tugela in 1825. If anything the axis
of the state was at this stage along the Tugela, as Cele and Mbo groups
in the region voluntarily fused with Shaka. Whether these southerly
movements are to be viewed as a reaction away from the slaving areas, or
as positive alignments towards the Europeans at Port Natal is an open
question. To attempt to explain these sequences in terms of a search
for a better combination of grazing and cultivation fails to provide an
adequate balance between cause and the issue (the growth of the Zulu
state) to be explained.
It should be stressed that whilst the evolution of this state, as
Hamilton makes clear, is complex, the scale of the changes should not be
exaggerated. The formation associated with Shaka is comparable with
other emergent states of roughly the same era such as Mzilikazi's and
Moshoeshoe's, both equally complex, equally 'revolutionary', equally
assimilative. Additionally, Shaka's state was in the context of Zulu
history merely the first and most primitive stage in an evolutionary
sequence which was to culminate in Mpande' s kingdom of the 1860s. In
view of the regional circumstances in which the Zulu kingdom developed
between about 1815 and 1830 it is surely misleading to term it a
' precolonial' state at any point in its career. Its very nature was
influenced by white pressures and intervention. The whites themselves
created mini-states in the area to the south of the Port which changed
from being allies of the Zulu to profound threats. In 1828 it was an
alliance of these white-led predatory groups which attacked the Mpondo.
Ordinance 49, the raids on the Ngwane, and Fynn and Farewell's attempts
to entice settlement north led to a reckoning in which the whites joined
with internal opponents to kill Shaka in September 1828 and install the
hopefully more malleable Dingane. It is significant that some of the
most powerful of Shaka's supporters refused to accept Dingane, and that
an extensive civil war occurred between 1828 and c. 1832 in which the
whites backed Dingane. Dingane's victory, the transference of the state
back north of the Tugela, the slaving activities of Farewell, Fynn and
Isaacs, the falling out of the whites and Dingane, the adaptations in
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state structure during Dingane's career, the extent and nature of Zulu
involvement at the Bay and as slavers in the 1830s are all issues which
have so far remained unstudied. By another irony, explainable by the
later historiographical manipulations, the post-1830s development of the
kingdom under Mpande and Cetshwayo produced something like the
propaganda picture of the 1820s - another conjurer's illusion which
'confirmed' the early literature and closed it to question.
Possibly even less researched than any of the foregoing are interactions
in the region between the Kei and the Mzimkhulu during the 1820s. The
repeated insinuation of 'mfecane theory' that this area was penetrated
by huge numbers of refugees fleeing Shaka has never been seriously
investigated and is not supported by the evidence. On the contrary, the
'transkei', like the Caledon, was a regional interface between the
fronts of white penetration - within reach of refugees from the
south-west Bay hinterland, the Caledon and Orange, and the eastern
frontier. Local predators such as Faku's Mpondo, Ncaphayi's Bhaca and
Ngugencuka's Tembu were joined by Fynn's own raiders, by white and
'coloured' hunters, traders and bandits, by the cross Drakensberg raids
of the Mokhoteli and Tlokwa, and by the incursions of the Ngwane. In
the north-west, Hlubi incursions are as likely to have had their origin
in slaving as in Zulu action (and note the Hlubi who fled into Shaka's
kingdom). Most lethal of all were the compressions of the British in
the south. In 1826 British missionaries crossed the Kei into Gcaleka
territory. A crossfire of propaganda between the Mzimkhulu and
Butterworth pleaded for direct expansion north of the Kei through Mpondo
into Natal; to further this, alliances were made with both Mpondo and
Tembu first against the Ngwane, subsequently against the Gcaleka
themselves. Both groups were caught between two fires of white
destabilisation; but we have heard that before. All this awaits a
study; nevertheless the primary of southern pressures is clear. What
passed south was British disinformation, not Zulu armies and refugees
displaced by them.
The first people labelled 'Fingo' were the odd individuals who
gravitated to the mission stations set up east of the Fish river in the
early 1820s. There are some indications that the word had southern
origins west of the Fish, and that its versatile meaning embraced early
initiates, tribal misfits, opportunists and 'collaborators', displaced
' kaf f irs' in the region south of the Kei, as well as migrants, for
example from north of the Orange. In missionary useage around 1828
'Fetcani' and 'Fingo' are interchangeable in many passages. One does
not have to look far for the agents of this uprooting and labelling.
The Ngwane captured in the raids of 1828 were also designated Fingos, an
early use of the term for 'forced labourer'. In the early 1830s the
word was being used for people as widely divergent as forced labourers
and a contingent of armed Xhosa collaborators who were to be used in the
next 'frontier war'. The accretion of meaning; the very fuzziness of
the word was to have advantages after 1835.
By 1833 an even acuter shortage of labour on the eastern frontier
coincided with Britain's abolition of slavery. This did not deter the
settlers from raiding the Rharhabe for slaves in the period before the
war. But even more elaborate covers as compared to those of 1828 were
necessary. The 'war' that followed, 'D'Urban's war' of 1834-35, was in
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essentials a massive land, cattle and labour raid on the Rharhabe and
Gcaleka in particular, which dwarfed the Mbolompo campaign in scale.
The British army seized well over 50,000 'Xhosa' cattle, and, a fact
unnoticed even by specialists on the Gcaleka, 17,000 (sic) Gcaleka
prisoners - 85% of whom were women and children - in a series of
spectacular raids in the first few months of 1835. A combination of the
'war' and the penetration of the region between the Keiskamma and the
Kei by British administration at last solved the labour supply crisis at
the crude level. The further land seizures over the next twenty years,
masters and servants ordinances, hut taxation, and missionary
encouragement soon fine-tuned a modern labour procurement strategy which
during the 1890s spread throughout Africa. Given the context of 1835,
however, the true provenance of the Fingos, as the prisoners inevitably
were called, was concealed. The raids around Butterworth and along the
upper Kei of March-June 1835 were erased from the texts. An elaborate,
though threadbare, story of vast groups fleeing from the Zulu only to be
persecuted by the Gcaleka - an updating of the 1828 Zulu raid alibi -
was unimaginatively evolved by D'Urban's military entourage, which,
suspiciously, included H.F. Fynn. It is not yet known where the Zizi
and Bhele 'chiefs' were obtained, but the possibility that they were
members of Fynn's Mzimkhulu hierarchy, temporarily unemployed, is the
hypothesis under investigation. As for the Hlubi 'Fingos', they were
peoples who migrated into the north-eastern Cape from the eastern Orange
Free State in the early 1850s and after, who were inserted back into the
1
 flight from the Zulu in the 1820s' in subsequent historiographical
adjustments. The fingo fiction satisfied 'London' with one and a half
eyes averted. Throughout the 1840s and 1850s the false history,
originally attributable to the military, was embroidered by
intellectuals and missionaries. The Butterworth missionary, Ayliff, for
example, whose contemporary diary of 1831-34 makes no mention of these
Fingos, plagiarised the settler-military myth in a series of essays in
the early 1850s, which were paraded by later writers as if they had been
written in the early 1830s. This in turn, along with much later
fantasies about ' the Mbo' penned by Scully, was incorporated into
Whiteside's History of the AmaMbo (1912). The uncritical repetition of
this material by historians of the eastern Cape is worth an inquest in
itself. Of course, the spectacular increase in the population of Fingos
between the 1830s and Union has nothing to do with sexual reproduction,
but quite a lot to do with displacements in subsequent 'frontier wars',
hut taxation, accelerating peasantisation, and adjustments to image in
the schools. 'Xhosa' collaborators who crossed north of the Kei into
Fingoland in the 1860s took with them the baggage of a false history as
part of the price for the land.
It is time, too, to end the debate as to the relative centrality and
'creativity' of the 'Great Trek1 and 'the mfecane'. Whilst the former
occurred, the latter is an historiographical illusion. They are facets
of the identical process. The Boer invasions of the high veld after
1835 were now to trigger events which were continuation and
intensification (as well as modernisation) of previous pressures, as the
trek itself was merely a stage in European expansion. The collision at
Vegkop (1836) and the slaughter of Retief's band (1338) coloured and
heightened the myths about the Ndebele and the Zulu which the Boers,
departing from Godlonton's Grahamstown, took with them in the first
place. Black states grew into their own myths. Like the Ngwane in
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1828, the Ndebele were now hit by a third and infinitely stronger force:
an alliance between the Boers, Griqua and both 'Sotho1 and 'Tswana' from
the far from depopulated Orange Free State. After bitter fighting
during 1838 the Ndebele fled north of the Limpopo. Dingane was
eliminated two years later, Mosega and Blood River indices of the true
balance of power in the subcontinent. Mpande's kingdom of the 1840s and
1850s was an opportunistic response to the particular outcome of the
Anglo-Boer struggle south of the Tugela. Moshoeshoe's precisely
contemporary kingdom east of the Caledon had analogous foundations.
Both 'Sotho' and 'Zulu' kingdoms were defined in terms of boundaries
during a lengthy struggle to prevent themselves caving in completely.
Both kingdoms reached their peaks in the 1850s, the former collapsing
under Boer attacks in the 1860s, the latter succumbing to direct British
invasion in 1879. To repeat an earlier point: at no time can either of
these formations be termed 'pre-colonial'. It was the pressures of
colonial expansion and slaving which produced them in the first place.
Modern concepts of 'pre-colonial societies' and 'Africanist history1
have closely accompanied the concept of the mfecane, and have served
even when unintentionally, the same type of ends.
Similar patterns of state evolution occurred during the era of the Boer
invasions of the northern and eastern Transvaal. Albasini's state on
the Letaba, for example, drew peoples fleeing the slave trade at the
Bay. In certain respects it paralleled the mini-states set up by Fynn
and Farewell on the Mzimkhulu a decade earlier. The Maroteng-Pedi and
Dlamini-Swazi 'reactive' states effloresced (after relatively fortuitous
beginnings) in the 1840 s, reached a peak in the early 1860s, and
progressively collapsed after about 1875. Maroteng state building goes
back at least to the 1770s. Delius notes a general interconnection
between an increased regional violence at that time and the trade at the
coast. Not having information about the slaving, however, he quite
rightly remained puzzled by the lack of sufficient cause for trends
which extended to the Steelpoort. The Dlamini fled from the south Bay
area across the Lebombo into the middle Pongola valley, perhaps sometime
between 1750 and 1790. The bids to produce 'mfecane' genealogies for
both states is somewhat artificial, Delius resorting to a possible
Ndwandwe invasion of the Steelpoort valley in c. 1822, Bonner, for the
Dlamini, to a hypothesis that Swazi militarism derived from Zwide via
Sobhuza's Ndwandwe wife, Fulata. Without the Boer invasions of the
1840s and the slaving at the Bay, however, there would have been nothing
to write about. As with his competitor Albasini, Sekwati (Pedi)
augmented his following with peoples who had fled both from the Boers
and from the eastern low veld, as the Gaza stepped up slave raiding
after about 1842. As with Moshoeshoe in the Caledon, Sekwati had to
shoulder aside local rivals: who was to create the nucleus of the local
'reactive' state remained in doubt until fairly late. More spectacular
still was the expansion of Mswati's 'Swazi' state in the 1850s.
Declining slave prices at the Bay induced Manukosi of the Gaza to switch
supply to the eastern Transvaal Boers - with payment mainly in guns and
horses - whose demand for labour reassembled that of the Albany settlers
in the 1820s. Mswati's successful challenge of the Gaza monopoly was
accompanied by far-reaching military restructuring in the 1850s. The
state began to swell into its later boundaries with the absorption of
the hitherto independent amakhandzambile ('those found ahead'), again in
the 1850s. Nothing of this was predestined in Sobhuza's reign.
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'The mfecane' thus breaks down in every one of its sectors, whether
geographical or chronological. The whole is rotten; and so is each of
the parts. The attempts to 'reform1 the mfecane by Maylam and Davenport
by conceding the point about depopulation, or contending that this or
that was exaggerated (perhaps a little rephrasing...) are doomed to
frustration. (There is no half-way house). The thing is unreformable,
unadjustable, unrepairable. Keep it (if you like) or abandon it
altogether. In the latter case an enormous hole opens the filling up of
which should keep us busy for many years (if we have those years).
In my remaining paragraph I must ul tra-briefly turn to the problems
inherent in defining and classifying the new type of states which
emerged during this {longer: c. 1740s - 1850s) era. They were not
specific to southern Africa at all, but resembled (and differed from)
contemporary formations in both east and west Africa. The changes did
not revolve around the emergence of a 'regimental' or 'raiding'
formation: that is a legacy of the Zulu-centric approach, an error which
follows from swallowing 'the mfecane'. Yet the Zulu was a variant
example of the general process. It was not the emergence of the ibutho,
but the restructuring and readaptation of the ibutho in the context of
European pressures which was significant. The 'revolution' was not even
•Nguni'. It was not even 'Bantu1. Parallel and equally far-reaching
changes took place within 'Tsonga' , 'Sotho' , 'Tsv/ana' , and, for that
matter, 'San1 and 'Khoi' formations. Given the fusion of different
peoples in many of the examples, these terms become a hinderance to
analysis. There was such a wide spectrum of equally relevant 'emergent'
states, with 'war lord' leaders (to use Martin Hall's term), that it is
difficult to know where to place the boundaries. Note the rainbow
sequence: Boer commando - Griqua commando - Koranna - Taung - Kololo -
Ngwaketse for example. Or, British army - Fingo units - Ndlambe - Tembu
- Mpondo - Gcaleka. Or, Fynn and Farewell's organisation - Thuli - Cele
- Mbo - Zulu. Alternatively, Albasini's state - Sekwati's - Pedi -
'Swazi' - Gaza - Portuguese slavers - to go round in a circle. In
nearly every instance there were increased power of chiefs, new
hierarchies, new patronage systems, restructuring of military
organisations, the obtaining of firearms, larger size, amalgamations,
greater levels of violence etc. To attempt to establish a general 'law'
for all this - a sort of mathematical formula - is surely to chase a
mirage. None of these adapted states was 'pre-colonial' at any moment:
the idea of 'a precolonial mode of production' (southern African
variant) is also a fantasy. Each, if I may make my one reference to
Perry Anderson, is definable in terms of its 'superstructure'. This
gives us greater analytical flexibility, and enough oxygen to be able to
return to history and submerge for long enough to be able to retrieve
sufficient empirical material free from the worry about having to
pronounce a general law. A prize for the one who discovers an
unsullied, 'pure' African state, with a real, uncontaminated 'internal
revolution'. The mere existence of evidence precludes
non-contamination. And with no evidence the secret of the 'inner
trajectory of change1 will go to the grave in silence. Two things are
surely certain: in origin all were 'defensive', or 'reactive' even,
indeed, especially when successfully expansionist; and all of them,
brought into being by capitalism, embracing what they could of
capitalist techniques in order to avoid catastrophe, were, nevertheless,
one by one, ununitedly, broken down and exploded by the system which had
18
jolted them into life.
In Briefest Conclusion
The Afrocentricism, Zulucentricism, and both the chronological and
spatial teleological chain reactions of 'mfecane theory' collapse on
close inspection. External pressures - particularly the heightened
demand fo sugar in Europe and British market and lebensraum requirements
- involved change over a much lengthier period than the (in this
context) irrelevant boundaries of Shaka's reign. The Zulu were only one
of a spectrum of 'reactive' states, some of which experienced
accelerated change in the eighteenth century, others only developing
after Shaka was dead. There was never either a Zulu or 'Nguni' centre
to 'the mfecane'; rather, there were several peripheral but converging
foci of white penetration: the Cape, 'transorangia1, Natal and the Bay.
Black societies were like fish caught in a net: flight from one pressure
invariably took them straight into another perhaps worse (the Ngwane
nightmare being only the most notable). This accounts for the paradox
that the relatively unexceptional slave trade of southern Mozambique
came particularly in the period after 1800 to be interinvolved in
concatenations and escalations of violence which are unusual in Africa.
Whereas the 'normal' slave trade was critically amplified by settler
expansion and labour procurement systems, memory of the slave trades was
erased by settler propaganda. Removing themselves from the scene of
their own impact settlers achieved an historiographical sleight of hand
which was perfected over one hundred and fifty years. This vanishing
was accompanied by the unscrupulous framing of Shaka and other
'innocent' black figures such as, wierdly, MaNtatisi. The initial alibi
of concealing labour raids of the period c. 1820-1870 was overlaid by
another in the early twentieth century misaccounting for the land
division of 1913. A post 1940s variant depicts the Bantustans as
resulting from a self-sequestration by blacks into the areas they occupy
today during the 1820s and early 1830s. The longevity of such compound
lies was assured by the failure of decolonisation in the aftermath of
the Second World War, and by the deceptive normality and quality of
South African historiography during the 1960s and 1970s. It was not,
therefore, 'the mfecane' that was unique to the world; it was, rather,
the unsifted preservation of the flamboyant fictions, fantasies and lies
of the era of Fynn, their ornamentation by Theal and his colleagues
before the First World War, and their delivery intact to the media,
educational and propaganda machinery of one of the most efficient and
futuristic of totalitarian states of the present. The resultant even
further embroidered mythologies and lies are fed to our schoolchildren
and university students daily.
POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF NATAL'S MFECANE
John Wright




Over the last twenty years or so the concept of the mfecane
has come to be deeply rooted as a notion round which much of
the history of southern Africa in the first half of the 19th
century is written. As generally used, the term refers to a
series of wars and migrations which are supposed to have been
sparked off by the emergence of the Zulu kingdom in the late
1810s, and then to have swirled across most of the eastern
half of the sub-continent. In the view of many historians,
these upheavals were the direct cause of the profound changes
in the political map of southern Africa which took place In
the 1820s and 1830s, changes which in turn were of the
greatest significance in shaping the nature of black-white in-
teraction in southern Africa for the rest of the century. (1)
In a series of so far unpublished papers written since 1983,
Julian Cobbing has formulated a radical and sweeping critique
of the notion that the mfecane actually happened. (2) While
not denying that the history of African societies in the ear-
lier 19th century was marked by numerous violent conflicts, he
rejects the particular significance which white writers since
at least the mid-19th century have attached to them. He
empasizes that they were a continuation of conflicts which had
begun long before the 1810s, conflicts whose primary cause was
not the expansion of the Zulu kingdom but the onslaught which
Dutch and British settlers and imperialists at the Cape and,
to a lesser extent, Portuguese slavers at Delagoa bay were
making on neighbouring African societies in their unrelenting
attempts to seize control of land and labour-power. The
upheavals of the times had not one but several epicentres. The
1. For example J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: a
Nineteenth-Centurv Revolution in Bantu Africa. London, 1966,
chs. 1, 12; P. Maylam, A History of the African People of
South Africa, Cape Town, 1986, ch. 4; R. Edgecombe, 'The
Mfecane or Difaqane', in T. Cameron & S.B. Spies, eds., An Il-
lustrated History of South Africa. Johannesburg, 1986, ch. 9.
2. J. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane1, unpublished
seminar paper, University of Cape Town, 1983; 'The case
against the mfecane', unpublished seminar paper. University of
the Witwatersrand, 1984 (a slightly modified version of the
UCT paper); 'The myth of the mfecane1, unpublished seminar
paper, University of Durban-Westville, 1987; 'The mfecane as
alibi: thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', unpublished ms.,
1987.
role attributed in the literature to the Zulu is not based on
historical evidence: rather, it is a product of the search
made by imperialist and settler ideologues for a plausible
alibi for the colonial-based interests whose aggressions were
ultimately responsible for the violence and social disruptions
of the period. For their own various ideological reasons,
subsequent generations of historians, including that of the
present, have either been concerned to maintain the alibi, or
at the very least, have done nothing to demonstrate its fal-
sity. From this perspective the notion of the mfecane is noth-
ing but an interest-serving myth. Historians, Cobbing argues,
urgently need to abandon not just the term itself, but the
whole set of interlinked assumptions, distortions and false-
hoods which it embodies, and to address themselves to the
business of developing an entirely new analysis of southern
AErican history in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
This paper, which focusses specifically on the Natal region,
lends support to Cobbing's notion of the mfecane.as myth. (3)
It presents, in bald outline, the results of a survey of ac-
counts published since the late 1820s of the upheavals which
are supposed to have taken place in Natal south of the Thukela
river in the late 1810s and early 1820s. In these literary
descriptions, as they have emerged over a period of 160 years,
three elements have been found to recur. First, that Natal
was 'devastated1 (to use one of a group of synonyms which ap-
pear in the literature with monotonous regularity) and its
population largely exterminated or driven out. Second, that
the devastation was the work of the Zulu. Third, that it was
carried out as an act of deliberate policy. Over time, the
historical context of what is here called the devastation
stereotype has varied, but the three elements which make up
its content have remained firmly fixed. In its entire history,
only one writer has made more than a token attempt to root it
in historical evidence. (4) From a historiographical perspec-
tive, the mfecane as it is supposed to have happened in Natal
turns out to be the latest reworking of a set of ideas whose
history dates back directly to the late 1820s and early 1830s.
Generation after generation of writers has uncritically
reproduced these ideas to form one of the most enduring myths
in southern African history-writing. Before the history of
Natal in the early 19th century can be rewritten, the poverty
of mfecane-theory's intellectual lineage has to be laid bare.
This paper aims, by outlining an explanation of how the
stereotype came into existence, and why it has survived for so
long, to contribute to that process.
3. The argument that follows is a heavily compressed version
of a much longer study written as a chapter of a not yet com-
pleted Ph.D. dissertation on the history and historiography of
the Thukela-Mzimkhulu region in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. My thanks go to Julian Cobbing and Philip Bonner
for their critical comments on the fuller version.
4. This was A.T. Bryant: see pp. 10-11 below.
The stereotype created
The history of the devastation stereotype begins soon after
the arrival in 1824 of the first party of British traders to
establish themselves at Port Natal. Within a short time of
their arrival they were beginning to report that the region
round Port Natal was largely empty of population, and to de-
velop and publicize an explanation for this phenomenon. This
explanation, to the effect that the previous inhabitants had
either been killed or driven out by the Zulu under Shaka a few
years before, was beginning to appear in Cape Town newspapers
in 1825 and 1826, and in printed books by 1827. (5) At the
same time specific literary images of the Zulu and of Shaka
were beginning to take shape, with the Zulu being described by
writers like King and Thompson as the warlike and bloodthirsty
agents of Natal's devastation, and Shaka as the ferocious and
savage leader who directed them. (6) Over the next decade
these ideas were consolidated by a number of other writers -
Owen, Pringle, Kay, Boteler, Steedman and, in particular,
Isaacs - into literary forms which in.their essence have sur-
vived to the present day. (7)
Few of these writers had actually set foot at Port Natal, and
none of them had been eyewitnesses of the processes of
destruction which they adumbrated. The evidence on which they
based their descriptions was derived directly or indirectly
from Africans living in Natal, but nowhere in the works of
these writers is there any mention of the identity of these
informants, or of the circumstances in which their testimony
was obtained and recorded. Most of the information which was
distilled into the devastation stereotype was probably col-
lected from members of the remnant groups which the traders
found living about Port Natal and in the neighbouring coastal
regions. It is germane to make the point here that Port Natal
5. B. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, Pretoria, 1984,
p. 51; G. Thompson, Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa,
ed. V.S. Forbes, Cape Town, 1967 (1st ed. London, 1827), vol.
1, p. 172, voi: 2, p. 249.
6. Thompson, Travels and Adventures, vol.1, pp. 172, 174-5,
vol. 2, pp. 248, 249.
7. H.W. Robinson, ed., Narrative of Voyages to Explore the
Shores of Africa. Arabia and Madagascar Per formed... under the
Direction of Captain W.F.W. Owen, R.N., vol. 1, Farnborough,
1968 (reprint of 1st ed., London, 1833), p. 71; T. Pringle,
African Sketches, London, 1834, p. 362n; S. Kay, Travels and
Researches in Caffraria, New York, 1834, pp. 281, 341, 343,
344; T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa
and Arabia, vol. 2, London, 1835, p. 303; A. Steedman, Wander-
ings and Adventures in the Interior of South Africa, vol. 2,
London, 1835, pp. 200-201; N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures
in Eastern Africa, ed. L. Herman & P.R. Kirby, Cape Town, 19 7 0
(1st ed. London, 1836), esp. ch. 18.
was situated precisely in the one region of Natal which had in
fact been overrun by Zulu forces, (8) and it is likely that
the generalized depictions of the destruction of Natal which
were noised abroad by the traders were a reflection of the
particular experiences of informants from this region.
For their own part, the traders had every interest in
propagating the idea that Natal was, by the time of their ar-
rival, largely empty of inhabitants, and that Shaka's Zulu had
been the agents of their dispersal or destruction. From the
very first, the leading traders at Port Natal were concerned
not only to open up commerce with the Zulu but also to try to
establish rights to large tracts of land round the port. (9)
In the face of the express reluctance of the Cape government
to sanction the acquisition of further territorial posses-
sions, (10) they attempted to minimize objections to their
proceedings by asserting the claim that the land in question
was virtually uninhabited.
If the Port Natal traders had a direct material interest in
propagating the 'myth of the empty land1, so too did the Cape
merchants who in large part financed their early trading ven-
tures. (11) In the late 1820s and early 1830s the rising com-
mercial class and its associates in both the eastern and the
western Cape were beginning to exert pressure on the British
authorities in Cape Town and London to annex Natal and estab-
lish it as a colony of British settlement. (12) This class's
spokesmen often used the notion of a depopulated Natal to un-
derpin their arguments for the desirability of the territory's
annexation. (13)
8. This emerges from a piecing together of the evidence con-
tained in A.T. Bryant's works (see pp. 10-11 below) and in the
four volumes so far published of The James Stuart Archive of
Recorded Oral Evidence Relating to the History of the Zulu and




9. H.F.Fynn, The Diary of Henry Francis Fynn, ed. J. Stuart
D. McK. Malcolm, Pietermaritzburg, 1950, pp. 86-8; Isaacs,
Travels and Adventures,, pp. 142, 180-1; Lever ton, ed. , 
of Natal, vol. 1, pp. 37-40, 247-8.
10. Leverton, ed., Records of Natal, vol. 1, p. 36.
11. On the financing of these expeditions see Fynn, Diary, ch
3; B. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, London, 1974, pp. 8-19, 75-6,
78-81.
12. S. Bannister, Humane Policy; or Justice to the Aborigines
of New Settlements. appendices 1, 6 & 7; J. Chase, ed. The Na
tal Papers, Cape Town, 1968 (1st ed. Grahamstown, 1843), pp.
23-31; P.R. Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith and Natal, Cape Town,
1955, pp. 5-7, 145-6; Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp. 222-5.
13. Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith and Natal, pp. 148, 155, 170; L.
Herman & P.R. Kirby, 'Nathaniel Isaacs: a biographical
sketch', in their edition (cited at note 7 above} of Isaacs's
Propagation of the myth thus served a clear material purpose.
So too did the fostering of the image of Shaka as the cruel
and despotic leader of a warlike Zulu nation. Though in writ-
ing of Shaka and the Zulu in lurid detail, writers like King
and Isaacs clearly had an eye on their reading public, they
and others also wrote to publicize and propagate the pro-
annexationist cause. By depicting the Zulu and their king as a
potential threat to the security of the Cape's eastern fron-
tier region, or alternatively as the potential allies of rival
powers, they hoped to influence the British authorities into
annexing Natal and thereby paving the way for the extension of
British trade and settlement. (14) Though some scepticism was
voiced in the Cape Town press about the reality of the image
of Shaka put about by the Natal traders, (15) in the early
1830s the notion of the 'numerous and warlike1 Zulu as a
'threat' was becoming widespread in the discourse of Cape mer-
chants and others with an interest in Natal. (16)
By the mid-1830s, then, the devastation stereotype was well
established in the literature on southern Africa. It is im-
portant for the argument being advanced here to note that of
the writers so far cited as having been responsible for fixing
the stereotype in print, virtually all were either members of,
or had close associations with, the business communities of
Cape Town and the eastern Cape. (17) All of them directly or
indirectly propounded the virtues of the regions beyond the
borders of the Cape colony as fields for the expansion of Cape
and British commerce.
From the later 1830s the stereotype began to be taken up and
disseminated by members of another influential body of
opinion-moulders and image-builders, the missionaries who were
active in southern Africa. Though there were wide differences
of opinion between them as to the benefits or otherwise of the
extension of European settlement, they were united in wanting
to promote 'civilized' European government. Many aligned them-
selves with the .merchants' call for the 'opening up1 of the
interior, and at the same time used much the same kind of his-
Travels and Adventures, p. xi; R. Godlonton, Introductory
Remarks to a Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes,
parts I & II, Cape Town, 1965 (1st publ. Grahamstown, 1836),
pp. 165-6.
14. Thompson, Travels and Adventures. vol. 1, p. 174, vol. 2,
p. 2 49; Isaacs, Travels and Adventures. p. 3 39.
15. Roberts, The Zulu Kings, pp. 154, 177.
16. Chase, ed., Natal Papers, p. 27; Godlonton, Introductoprv
Remarks, pp. 162-8, 172; Kirby, ed., Andrew Smith in Natal,
pp. 149-51, 153-4, 166-8, 171-2.
17. The evidence is presented in detail on p. 14 of the wider
study mentioned in note 3 above.
torical rationale to justify it. (18)
The stereotype appropriated
In the 1840s the hopes of merchants and missionaries for the
•opening up1 of Natal at last began to be realized. In 1843
Britain annexed the region between the Thukela and the
Mzimkhulu, and in 1849-51, several thousand British settlers
were established in the new colony to help speed up the pro-
cess of 'civilizing' it. But with the achievement of some of
the main goals of its progenitors, the devastation stereotype
did not wither away. On the contrary, over the next few
decades it was vigorously taken up, embellished and propagated
by numerous writers in the service of a new cause - that of
the Natal colonists.
Though there were often strong differences of opinion between
officials, settlers and missionaries over what policies were
appropriate for dealing with the colony's now rapidly increas-
ing African population, they were by and large united in the
notions that the safeguarding and expansion of their various
newly acquired estates required the subordination of Africans
to the political tutelage of Europeans. Like colonizing groups
everywhere, the Natal colonists sought to justify to them-
selves and to others both their occupation of lands formerly
inhabited by other people, and their status as overlords or
would-be overlords of the indigenous peoples. The devastation
stereotype was admirably suited to the version of Natal's his-
tory which they developed to suit their ideological needs. It
justified the presence of European colonists in Natal on the
grounds that they had established themselves in a largely
empty land. It justified their attempts - ultimately success-
ful - to establish domination of the African population on the
grounds that the coming of white rule had put an end to the
ravages of the Zulu and inaugurated an era of peace and
stability. It justified their continual demands for an in-
crease in the size of the British garrison to defend them
against the threat posed by the savage Zulu kingdom across the
Thukela.
Perhaps the clearest example of the early appropriation of the
devastation stereotype by settler ideologues is to be found in
the report, which appeared in 1853, of a major official com-
18. Kay, Travels and Researches, pp. 281, 341, 343, 344; D.
Kotze, ed., Letters of the American Missionaries 1835-1838,
Cape Town, 1950, p. 97; G. Champion, Journal of the Reverend
George Champion 1835-1839, ed. A. Booth, Cape Town, pp. 15,
62; W. Boyce, Notes on South African Affairs, Cape Town, 19 71
(reprint of 1st ed., Grahamstown, 1838), pp. x, 171, 173-4; B.
Shaw, Memorials of South Africa, Cape Town, 19 70 (1st ed.
London, 18 40), pp. 4 4-5; T. Arbousset & F. Daumas, Narrative
of an Exploratory Tour to the North-East of the Colony of the
Cape of Good Hope, Cape Town, 1968 (repr. of 1st English ed.,
Cape Town, 1846), ch. 17, esp. p. 148.
mission appointed to enquire into the state of the colony's
African inhabitants. The commission was dominated by repre-
sentatives of the settlers: its declarations on the
precolonial history of Natal were of the kind that became com-
mon in the literature over the next seventy years. After Shaka
had become king, the commissioners reported, the Zulu became
'a desolating scourge to all the surrounding tribes and na-
tions within a circle of 500 miles'. He 'completely conquered
the Natal tribes with immense slaughter, devastated the whole
country and added it to his dominions, from the Itongati down
to St. John's River'. The survivors were carried off and in-
corporated in small groups into the Zulu people. 'The Natal
tribes then ceased to have any separate national existence
. . . • . (19)
Stated in these sentences is an important part of the histori-
cal creed of an emerging settler society. The last sentence is
perhaps the most significant. For intruding settlers, thrown
together from disparate backgrounds and attempting to estab-
lish, first, a social existence and identity in territory pre-
viously inhabited solely by African communities, and second,
political domination over their Africa fellow-colonists, it
was important to minimize in their own eyes the rights to land
of the people among whom they settled. The notion that the Af-
rican societies which had formerly occupied Natal no longer
had any coherent existence was clearly convenient to their
purpose.
The accounts of Natal's history which emerged from the pens of
colonial-based writers in the 1850s and 1860s served to codify
views such as those expressed by the commission. (20) But
these writers did not simply reproduce the existing
stereotype: they also placed it in a more elaborate historical
context. The Cape and British-based originators of the
devastation thesis had been concerned primarily to expand the
geographical orbit of the Cape's commerce, and had had little
interest in investigating Natal's history beyond what was
necessary for constructing the thesis in bare outline. The
settlers, on the other hand, needed a more elaborate - and
denigratory - history of African societies in pre-European Na-
tal: one which spelt out in unmistakeable terms that the his-
tory of independent African societies was mostly one of wars
and destruction. Civilization in Natal had begun with the com-
19. Proceedings and Report of the Commission Appointed to in-
quire into the Past and Present State of the Kafirs in the
District of Natal.... Pietermaritzburg, 18 53, p. 6.
20. W.C Holden, History of the Colony of Natal. Cape Town,
1963 (reprint of 1st ed., London, 1855), pp. 55-7; and The
Past and Future of the Kaffir Races. Cape Town, 19 6 3 (reprint
of 1st ed., London, 1866), pp. 9-16, 20-28; J. Shooter, The
Kafirs of Natal and the Zulu Country. London, 1857, ch. 8; L.
Grout, Zulu-land; or. Life among the 2ulu-Kafirsr London, n.d
(1863), chs. 7, 8.
8ing of Europeans: for its impact to be the more fully appar-
ent, the barbarism and savagery of 'Zulu' society had to be
revealed in some detail. Hence in the works of settler
ideologues the devastation thesis came to be situated in the
context of a 'Zulu* history that extended back into the 18th
century and forwards to the Boer victories in the late 1830s
and the British annexation in the 1840s. (21)
The stereotype reinforced
The devastation stereotype as it had become entrenched in
settler historiography in the 1850s and 1860s survived quite
unchanged into the early 20th century. In the late 19th
century, as an alliance of British imperial interests and
white settler interests in southern Africa set out to bring
the sub-continent's African societies once and for all under
white domination, the stereotype began to penetrate more wide-
ly. It moved beyond the accounts of colonial historians and
local travellers to become established in reference works
ranging from Natal schools text books to the Encyclopaedia
Britannica, (22) and to become almost universally accepted in
literary discourse on southern Africa. (23)
Until this time the stereotype had remained based on the most
meagre and tenuous empirical evidence, and set mainly in the
context of the history of the Natal region. It existed very
much as a formula reproduced by rote rather than as scientifi-
cally argued history. In the late 19th and early 20th
centuries it was for the first time given powerful in-
tellectual underpinning. The voluminous writings of George
McCall Theal rooted it firmly in the wider context of southern
African history, and the works of Father Alfred Bryant on
'Zulu' history served to give it an apparently firm empirical
foundation.
Except for his very earliest work, Theal's histories were
strongly pro-settler in their slant. (24) Like other settler
21. The first author to have developed a detailed account of
this history seems to have been Shooter: see his Kafirs of Na-
tal, pp. 249-60.
22. H. Bryan, Our Country: an Elementary History of Natal,
London, n.d. (1909), pp. 28-31; Encyclopaedia Britannica. 9th
ed., vol. 24, Edinburgh, 1888, p. 828; and 11th ed., vol. 28,
Cambridge, 1911, pp. 1051-52.
23. Only two authors in the period under review have been
found in this study to have written in some respects directly
counter to the stereotype: A. Wilmot, The Story of the Expan-
sion of Southern Africa. Cape Town, 1895, p. 126; J. Voigt,
Fifty Years of the History of the Republic in South Africa
(1795-1845). vol. 1 Cape Town 1969 (reprint of 1st ed.,
London, 1899), pp. 185-92.
2 4. Recent critical studies of Theal are D. Schreuder, 'The
imperial historian as "colonial nationalist": George McCall
historians before and after him, he made no changes to the es-
sentials of the stereotype, but an immensely important innova-
tion on his part was to detach it from the history of the Na-
tal region and set it in a nev context. Most previous writers
had treated the pre-European history of Natal as part of the
overall history of that region: in Theal's works, by contrast,
the upheavals in'Natal before and after 1820 were treated as
part of the history of the African societies of southern Afri-
ca in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In his main
work, this history was covered in a block of chapters which
broke into a sequence of chapters on the history of European
settlerdom and officialdom at the Cape. (25)
With hindsight it can be seen that this structuring estab-
lished the preconditions for the emergence of mfecane-theory.
By sharply segregating the histories of African and European
societies in southern Africa, it allowed the impact of pre-
18205 European settler and imperial influences on African
societies largely to be side-stepped, and the violence of the
1820s to be attributed to purely 'African' causes. By linking
the history of the Zulu kingdom in this period ethnically with
that of other African societies across southern Africa rather
than regionally with that of neighbouring societies, both Af-
rican and European, in eastern southern Africa, it allowed the
rise of Shaka and the Zulu kingdom to be portrayed as the
spark which touched off a holocaust of intra-African violence
which swept across the whole sub-continent. Where, in the ear-
lier literature, the devastations supposedly caused by Shaka
had usually been projected as having been confined to the
eastern coastal regions, from Theal's time onward they were
universally seen as having affected much of the interior as
well. The devastation in Natal now came to be seen as simply
one aspect of a wider series of wars and migrations.
Schreuder has suggested that Theal's fairly novel sub-
continent-wide perspective was rooted in the movement towards
the creation of a common anti-imperial 'colonial' identity
which was beginning to emerge among the English-speaking com-
mercial classes and Afrikaner rural interests in the Cape in
the last two decades of the 19th century. In Theal's view, the
central theme of southern African history was the march of
European civilization, carried by Boer and British colonists
together, across the sub-continent in the face of resistance
from barbaric African tribes and of 'meddling' on the part of
the British imperial government. As Schreuder puts it, 'It
Theal and the making of South African history', in G. Martel,
ed., Studies in British Imperial History: Essays in Honour of
A.P. Thornton, London, 1986, pp. 95-158; C. Saunders, The
Making of the South African Past: Maior Historians on Race and
Class, Cape Town, 19 88, chs. 1-4.
25. G.M. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795. vol. 1,
London, 19 08, chs. 14, 15.
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was Theal, in fact, who historically invented white "South Af-
rica"1, and his histories provided an important element in the
emergence of an ideology of colonial nationalism and white
supremacy. (26)
Theal's treatment of the history of African societies, it is
suggested here, was a necessary counterpart of his concern
with the white colonial civilizing mission. If white colonists
were to be seen as the bearers of civilization, then, in a
pioneering colonial nationalist historiography that was emerg-
ing when the process of bringing African people under the con-
trol of white settlers was by no means over, it was important
to demonstrate in some detail that the culture of African
peoples was barbaric, and their history largely one of war and
destruction. The 'Zulu devastations' posited by Theal thus
formed an important backdrop to what he saw as the essentially
civilizing mission of the Great Trek.
If Theal provided the devastation stereotype with a new con-
text, he added nothing to it by way of fresh evidence. The
first author to go much beyond the handful of primary accounts
on which the stereotype was based was Father A.T. Bryant,
whose career as a writer of history overlapped with the latter
part of Theal's. Where Theal had been the first historian in
South Africa to produce full-length studies based on in-
tensive, if superficial and selective, archival research,
Bryant was among the first writers to produce histories based
largely on oral testimony collected from African informants.
Between 1905 and 1929 he published a number of works on the
history of the Natal-Zululand region which are still widely
used - usually quite uncritically - as primary sources. (27)
These works were the first to set out detailed, though dis-
continuous and confusing, accounts of the upheavals of the
late 1810s and early 1820s, but, far from challenging the
stereotype, Bryant presented his information in such a way as
to reinforce it.
26. Schreuder, 'The imperial historian as "colonial nation-
alist"', in Martel, ed., Studies in British Imperial History,
pp. 96-8, 114-15, 129-33, 138-47. The quotation is from p.
97.
27. Bryant's first major historical work was the essay
entitled 'A sketch of the origin and early history of the Zulu
people', which was published as a preface to his Zulu-English
Dictionary, Mariannhill, 1905, pp. 12*-66*. This was followed
by a series of articles published in the newspaper Izindaba
Zabantu in 1910-13; these were reprinted after the author's
death in A.T. Bryant, A History of the Zulu and Neighbouring
Tribes, Cape Town, 1964. His widely influential Olden Times
in Zululand and Natal, was published in London in 1929. His
major ethnographic study, The Zulu People as They Were before
the White Man Came, Pietermaritzburg, 1929, begins with two
historical chapters.
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Bryant•s own work indicated that several 'waves' of non-Zulu
invaders had swept through much of Natal some time before the
advent of Shaka's Zulu armies, and that Zulu incursions had in
fact been confined to a comparatively small area. But, in
keeping with the established stereotype, he all but submerged
the role played by these precursors in favour of an emphasis
on the doings of the Zulu. His dramatized and often hyperboli-
cal description of Shaka's wars and conquests, one inherited
directly from the settler stereotype, underscored the idea
that Shaka and his 'Zulu murderers' were the main destroyers
of Natal. (28) In addition, Bryant's method of presenting the
region's history through a recital of the individual histories
of the numerous chiefdoms of Natal had the effect of repeated-
ly bringing Shaka and the Zulu into the narrative in the role
of conquerors, exterminators, and tribute-takers. For the
reader trying to pick his or her way through the mass of often
contradictory historical detail which Bryant presented, the
Zulu could hardly have emerged as anything other than the main
villains of the piece. In spite of the empirical richness of
his account, he was unable to break with the established
stereotype.
The stereotype sanctified
In the works of the liberal academic historians who dominated
the writing of South African history in English from the 1920s
onward, interest both in regional history and in the history
of autonomous African societies began to dry up. By this time
the affairs of the recently established Union of South Africa
were coming to overshadow those of its constituent parts in
political significance, and the social and political impact of
the country1s ongoing industrial revolution was preoccupying
its intellectuals as well as its politicians. The consequence
was another new turn in the history of the devastation
stereotype.
The emergence of liberal historiography in the post-World War
I era needs to be seen against the background of the erosion
of the bases of the old agrarian-commercial order, the spread
of poverty in the African reserves, the large-scale migration
of Africans to the urban areas and the resultant problems of
social control, and the formation of potentially formidable,
if unstable, political alliances between sections of the ex-
ploited African proletariat and frustrated and militant ele-
ments of the emerging African petty bourgeoisie. For liberal
intellectuals these developments posed a profound dilemma.(29)
28. The phrase 'Zulu murderers' occurs in his Dictionary, p.
49*.
29. On the nature of South African liberalism between the wars
see P.Rich, White Power and the Liberal Conscience: Racial
Segregation and South African Liberalism. Johannesburg, 19 84,
chs. 1-3; S. Dubow,'"Understanding the native mind": the im-
pact of anthropological thought on segregationist discourse in
South Africa, 1919-1933', unpublished conference paper, Uni-
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On the one hand they were concerned about the possible politi-
cal consequences of increased legal entrenchment of dis-
crimination against Africans, and of the increasing suppres-
sion of the material and political aspirations of the African
•elite1. On the other, they were fearful about the threat
which, to their minds, the processes of African urbanization
and proletarianization presented to 'civilized values' (read
•capitalist order1) in South Africa. The response of liberal
historians was two-fold. (30) In reaction against the racism
of settler historiography they turned their attention to the
history of 'race relations' in South Africa, and, to enable
liberals the better to grapple with the complex ramifications
of the 'native problem1, they began to focus on the nature of
the historical forces which, as they saw it, had drawn Afri-
cans and whites into a common society. Those fields of his-
tory which offered little or nothing by way of an explanation
of these issues were neglected.
As a result, the writing of precolonial history, whether lo-
cally focussed as in Natal colonial historiography, or broadly
focussed as in Theal's works, virtually died out. In turn this
meant that the devastation stereotype escaped the critical
scrutiny of the first generation of academic historians to
emerge in South Africa. With their main fields of interest
lying elsewhere, these historians were content to absorb
Theal's generalized view of the 'Zulu devastations' into their
own work, even if in the process they were concerned to strip
it of its more racist forms of expression. Thus in the works
of writers like Walker, Agar-Hamilton, Macmlllan, Hattersley,
De Kock, De Klewiet and others, the notion remained quite un-
challenged that Natal had been swept almost clear of in-
habitants during wars of extermination waged by Shaka and the
versity of the Witwatersrand, 1984', pp. 1-22; S. Dubow,
'Race, civilisation and culture: the elaboration of
segregationist discourse in the inter-war years', in S. Marks
& S. Trapido, eds., The Politics of Race, Class and Nation-
alism in Twentieth-Century South Africa. London, 19 87, ch. 2.
Less critical studies are R. Elphick, 'Mission Christianity
and interwar liberalism', in Butler et al., eds.. Democratic
Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and Prospect, Mld-
dletown. Conn., & Cape Town, 1987, ch. 3; and J. Butler, 'In-
terwar liberalism and local activism', in Butler et al., eds..
Democratic Liberalism, ch. 4.
30. On liberal historiography from the 1920s to the 1950s see
M. Legassick, 'The frontier tradition In South African histor-
iography', in S. Marks & A. Atmore, eds., Economy and Society
in Pre-Industrial South Africa. London, 1980, ch. 2; C.
Saunders, 'Liberal historiography before 1945', in J. Butler
et al., eds., Democratic Liberalism In South Africa: Its His-
tory and Prospect. Middletown, Conn., & Cape Town, 1987, ch.
7; J. Butler & D. Schreuder, 'Liberal historiography since
1945', in Butler at al., eds.. Democratic Liberalismf pp. 148-
56; Saunders, Making of the South African Past, chs. 5-9.
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Zulu. (31)
But the stereotype did not survive in early liberal histori-
ography simply by default. Part of the neglect of African
history by liberal historians from the 1920s onward must also
be put down to their often elitist attitude to the culture of
the African underclasses, and to their ambivalence on the is-
sue of what political rights to accord to Africans. (32) Even
if liberals rejected the notions put forward by racial
theorists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to the ef-
fect that the African 'race' was incapable pf 'catching up'
with the civilization of the European race, until at least the
1950s many of them still thought of cultural differences in
strongly evolutionist and hierarchical terms. Africans were
expected to 'adapt' their own cultures in the direction of
European culture, and, in effect, to reject their own past,
which had little, if anything, to do with 'progress'. From
the 1920s, African history was largely discounted by liberal
intellectuals, and the study of African societies was in-
creasingly seen as belonging to the emerging discipline of
anthropology rather than to history. Now that autonomous Af-
rican societies had been thoroughly subjugated, their versions
of history did not have to be contested, as had been necessary
in the era of white settlement: their overlords could simply
disregard their history altogether.
In the years between the two world wars one of the central
concerns of South African liberal intellectuals had been to
try to identify the 'problems' in white-black 'race relations'
which were seen as preventing orderly social evolution towards
the 'civilized' society which they ardently hoped for. Liber-
al historians had been concerned to look for the historical
roots of those problems as one means of working towards their
solution. After the National Party's electoral victory of
1948, and the further entrenchment of racial discrimination
and repression, the problem for liberal historians came to be
31. E. Walker, A Modern History for South Africans, Cape Town,
1926, p. 225; E. Walker, A History of South Africa, London,
1928, pp. 182-3; J. Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the
Voortrekkers, Cape Town, n.d. (1928), pp. 2-3; W.M. MacmilIan,
Bantu. Boer and Briton: the Making of the South African Native
Problem. London, 1929, pp. 13-14; A.F. Hattersley, South Afri-
ca 1652-1933. London, 1933, p. 75; M.H. de Kock, The Economic
Developmentof South Africa, London, 1941, p. 50; C.W. de
Kiewiet, A History of South Africa Social and Economic. Ox-
ford, 1941, pp. 49-50.
32. On this ambivalence see Rich, White Power, passim;
Saunders, 'Liberal historiography before 1945', in Butler et
al. eds., Democratic Liberalismf pp. 139, 145; Butler &
Schreuder, 'Liberal historiography since 1945', in Butler et
al, eds., Democratic Liberalism, pp. 154-6; D. Irvine, 'The
Liberal Party, 1953-19681, in Butler et al., eds., Democratic
Liberalism, pp. 117-19, 12 5-30.
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why whites had taken the 'wrong road1 and refused to share
power with blacks. The focus of their work swung further
towards political and constitutional history, with a con-
comitant further decline in the attention paid to African his-
tory. (33)
If early liberal historiography showed little interest either
in the history of African societies, or in the history of Na-
tal before the advent of Europeans, these subjects received
even less attention in the Afrikaner nationalist histori-
ography that was emerging from the early years of the 20th
century onwards. Whether it was in popular histories or in the
works of the professional historians who were becoming estab-
lished in the Afrikaans-language universities after World War
I, the focus of this historiography was overwhelmingly on the
history of Dutch-Afrikaner societies from the Great Trek to
the South African war of 1899-1902. So far as it touched on
the history of pre-Trek Natal, it simply reproduced the
stereotypes entrenched by Natal settler historiography and by
Theal and other contemporary writers, though now placing them
in the context of Voortrekker history rather than in the con-
text of Natal's history or the history of African societies.
In this context, the devastation stereotype served convenient-
ly to portray Natal as having been emptied of population be-
fore the coming of the Voortrekkers. (34) Together with con-
temporary liberal historians, then, Afrikaner nationalist his-
torians carried the devastation stereotype, set in the context
of settler history, from the early 20th century through into
the 1960s.
The stereotype africanized
It was not until the 1960s that historians turned back to
writing the history of the African societies of southern Afri-
ca. As is well known, its revival was an aspect of the
growth of interest in African history in general which ac-
companied the political decolonization of most of the con-
tinent north of the Zambezi. The ending of colonial rule
stimulated an eager demand among African political activists
and intellectuals, and among sympathizers in Europe and North
America, for a 'decolonized' African history, one which would
rescue Africans from the virtual oblivion to which they had
33. Saunders, 'Liberal historiography before 1945', in Butler
et al. , eds., Democratic Liberalism, p. 147; Butler &
Schreuder, 'Liberal historiography since 1945', in Butler et
al . , eds., Democratic Liberalism,, pp. 151-4, 160-1.
34. S. Gie, Geskiedenis vir Suid-Afrikar vol. 2, Stellenbosch,
1928, p. 306; E. Jansen, Die Voortrekkers in Natal: Qpstelle,
Cape Town, 1938, p. 1; A. du Plessis, 'Die republiek Natalia',
Archives Year Book for South African History. 1942, part I,
Cape Town, 1943, ch. 1; A. van der Walt, 'Die Groot trek tot
18381, in A. van der Walt et al., eds., Geskiedenis van Suid-
Afrikar vol. 1, Cape Town, 1951, p. 264.
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been consigned by colonial historiography, and which would em-
phasize African 'achievements*. An alliance of African na-
tionalist and metropolitan liberal historians moved to meet
this demand by producing history which took as its main
themes the emergence of great states in precolonial Africa,
the mounting of resistance to European conquest and colonial
rule, the growth of African nationalism, and the role of Afri-
can elites.
Within this context there was published in 1966 the first work
since Theal's to attempt a broad synthesis of the history of
the upheavals which had taken place in south-east Africa in
the 1820s and 1830s. This was J.D. Omer-Cooper's full-length
study, The Zulu Aftermath: a Nineteenth-Centurv Revolution in
Bantu Africa. (35) In important respects Omer-Cooper's ac-
count was similar to Theal's. It saw the violence of the peri-
od as having emanated from a single epicentre, the Zulu king-
dom, and as having radiated outward across much of southern
and central Africa. Omer-Cooper attributed the ultimate causes
of the upheavals to a build-up of population pressure in
south-east Africa in the later 18th century, rather than to
the personality of Shaka, as Theal had done, and he went
beyond Theal in seeing the effects of the violence as having
extended over wide areas of Central Africa, and as having per-
sisted into the latter half the 19th century. But, as the
title of his book indicates, like Theal he was looking for a
compendium explanation to cover what he saw as a single his-
torical phenomenon. (36)
In two respects, though, Omer-Cooper introduced major con-
ceptual innovations into the treatment of the subject. In the
first place, in sharp contrast to Theal, who had emphasized
the violence and bloodshed that had accompanied the upheavals
in order to portray them as an indication of African barbarism
and savagery, Omer-Cooper depicted them in positive terms as
'one of the great formative events of African history', as an
episode of 'nation-building' on the part of 'a galaxy of great
leaders'. (37) In the second place, he gave the upheavals a
single label, one which has stuck both in academic and in pop-
ular usage ever since. This was the term 'mfecane1, which he
gave as meaning 'the wars and disturbances which accompanied
the rise of the Zulu'. (38) The word had been used sporadical-
ly in the literature since the 1920s, though without a clearly
defined meaning. (39) Omer-Cooper both standardized its mean-
ing and projected it into general usage.
35. London, 1966.
36. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, introduction & pp. 19-27.
37. Ibid., pp. 4-7.
38. Ibid., p. 5n.
39. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane', unpublished
paper, University of the Witwatersrand, p. 5.
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In his treatment of the region south of the Thukela, to which
he devoted a chapter, Omer-Cooper drew heavily on Bryant's
Olden Times in Zululand and Natal. (40) There was nothing in
his account that explicitly contradicted the devastation
stereotype; if anything. The Zulu Aftermath served to give it
further academic respectability, and, by presenting it as an
integral part of the long.-established and now revamped notion
freshly packaged as the 'mfecane1, to publicize it more widely
than ever. From this time on, the history of the stereotype
was closely intertwined with that of mfecane-theory.
Few works on southern African history have had so immediate
and widespread an effect as The Zulu Aftermath. As Cobbing has
pointed out, within a few years of the book's publication both
the term mfecane (or difaqane) and the notion that the mfecane
was one of the central events of southern African history had
become embedded in Africanist discourse outside South Africa.
(41) It was widely established in general histories of Africa,
in academic articles and monographs, in university and schools
text books, and once again, though now in a quite different
context, in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. (42)
In the late 1960s and early 1970s South African academics be-
gan to catch on to the notion of the mfecane. The first to do
so were Afrikaner nationalist historians, who were quick to
spot the support which mfecane-theory lent to the ideological-
ly important notion that the first white settlers in the inte-
rior of southern Africa had moved into a land largely depopu-
lated by intra-African warfare. (43) A little later, under the
influence of overseas Africanists, liberal writers began to
incorporate the mfecane into their work as the fons et orioo
of the processes of African 'state-formation' (another term
for 'nation-building') round which they wrote the history of
African societies in south-eastern Africa in the first half of
40. Omer-Cooper, Zulu Aftermath, ch. 10.
41. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane', unpublished
paper. University of the Witwatersrand, pp. 5-7; and 'The myth
of the mfecane', unpublished paper, pp. 8-9.
42. S.M. (Shula Marks), article on the history of southern Af-
rica in Encyclopaedia Britannica. vol. 17, Chicago, 1974, p.
281.
43. C. Muller, 'The period of the Great Trek, 1834-1854', in
C. Muller, ed., Five Hundred Years: a History of South Africa,
Pretoria & Cape Town, 1969, p. 125; D. Ziervogel, fThe natives
of South Africa', in Muller, ed., Five Hundred Years, pp. 445-
8; F. van Jaarsveld, Van Van Rlebeeck tot Verwoerd 1652-1966,
Johannesburg, 1971, ch. 7; J. Bruwer, article on Shaka in
Standard Encyclopaedia of Southern Africa, vol. 9, Cape Town,
1973, p. 598; C. Muller, Die Oorsprona van die Groot Trek,
Cape Town, 197 4, esp. pp. 7 4-83.
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the 19th century. (44) They were followed by some African na-
tionalist writers, particularly those sympathetic to Zulu eth-
nic nationalism, for whom the 'nation-building' aspects of the
mfecane were an obvious attraction. (45)
By the later 1970s the mfecane was an established 'fact' of
southern African history. Though by then a reaction against
the more uncritical assumptions and assertions of Africanist
history was manifesting itself among liberal and radical-
revisionist historians alike, the mfecane lived on in South
Africa and abroad virtually unchallenged. In 1983 mfecane-
theory found standardized form in the first academic diction-
ary of south African history to be published. (46) In 1986 it
achieved coffee-table status, (47) and in 1987, some twenty
years on from The Zulu Aftermath, it was re-invigorated by
Omer-Cooper himself in a new text book on South African his-
tory. (48) In the late 1980s liberals, radicals, African na-
tionalists, and Afrikaner nationalists continued in an unlike-
ly, if unwitting, alliance, some propounding, some merely ac-
cepting, but virtually none challenging the validity of the
notion of the mfecane.
Mfecane-theory emerged at a time when liberal and African na-
tionalist historians outside southern Africa were seeking to
break away from racist and patronizing colonial cliches about
African culture and African history. It is easy to understand
why the notion of the mfecane as a period of African 'nation-
building* caught on so rapidly among them, and why it survives
today in the uncritically Africanist histories that continue
to be produced. It is easy, too, to understand the continuing
attraction of mfecane-theory's 'depopulation' thesis for the
ideologues of apartheid.
More problematic is the failure of contemporary critical lib-
44. For example the present author's Bushman Raiders of the
Drakensbera 1840-1870, Pietermaritzburg, 1971, pp. 15-17;
several of the articles in C. Saunders & R. Derricourt, eds.,
Beyond the Cape Frontier, London, 1974; C. Webb, fOf
orthodoxy, heresy and the difaqane', unpublished paper, Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand, 1974; and 'The Mfecane1, in Per-
spectives on the Southern African Past. Centre for African
Studies, University of Cape Town, 1979, ch. 9; T. Davenport,
South Africa: a Modern History, Johannesburg, 1977, pp. 10-17.
45. J. Ngubane, 'Shaka's social, political and military
ideas', in D. Burness, ed., Shaka King of the Zulus in African
Literature. Washington, D.C., 1976, pp. 140, 147.
46. C. Saunders, Historical Dictionary of South Africa,
Metuchen, N.J., & London, 1983, pp. 107-8.
47. Edgecombe, 'The Mfecane or Difaqane1, in Cameron & Spies,
eds., Illustrated History, ch. 9.
48. J.D. Omer-Cooper, History of Southern Africa, London,
1987, ch. 4.
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eral and radical-revisionist scholarship to challenge mfecane-
theory. At a superficial level this failure can be explained
in terms of the general decline of interest among scholars
abroad in African history since about the mid-1970s. (49) Re-
searchers are thinner on the ground than they used to be in
the days of the Africanist boom, and they have little incen-
tive to tamper with what appears to be a coherent and veil-
grounded set of notions which puts the precolonial African
states of southern Africa firmly on the historical map. In
South Africa itself, after a brief flowering in the 1970s, in-
terest in the region's precolonial history has waned as liber-
al and radical historians have increasingly focussed their re-
search and debates on the effects of capitalist penetration in
southern Africa from the late 19th century onward. Partly,
then, mfecane-theory survives today by default.
But, at a deeper level of explanation, it survives among lib-
eral historians, as Cobbing has argued, because it functions
to obscure the processes by which a white property-owning
class came to be politically dominant and in possession of
most of the land south of the Limpopo river. (50) By omitting
the role of white agency in the upheavals of the 1820s and
1830s, and by attributing them ultimately to the rise of the
Zulu kingdom, mfecane-theory is able to portray them as a con-
sequence of internecine African conflict. African agency thus
becomes responsible for opening the way for the penetration of
white settlers into a largely 'empty' interior, and the land-
grabbing of whites later in the century can be dovn-played.
Cobbing's argument perhaps overstresses the cohesion and
strength of white settler societies in the 19th century, but
its central point seems essentially correct. For liberal de-
fenders of South Africa's capitalist order, as well as for the
ideologues of South Africa's bantustan policies, mfecane-
theory provides an ideologically incontrovertible explanation
of the historical basis of South Africa's present-day patterns
of land distribution.
Among radical historians too mfecane-theory survives today
partly for ideological reasons. The 'structuralist • approach
which was dominant among radical writers in South Africa in
the 1970s did not encourage detailed scrutiny of historical
evidence. While the reaction on the part of many contemporary
radical historians against the often reductionist analyses
that were generated by their predecessors has made for the
production of a far more textured and nuanced kind of history,
49. T. Ranger, 'Towards a usable African past', in C. Fyfe,
ed., African Studies since 1945. London, 1976, p. 17; P.
Curt in, 'African history', in M. Kammen, ed., The Past before
Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States,
Ithaca & London, 1980, p. 115.
50. Cobbing, 'The case against the mfecane1, unpublished
paper. University of the Witvatersrand, pp. 1, 7-8, 16, and
'The myth of the mfecane', unpublished paper, pp. 1, 9-10, 30
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it has also meant a loss of much of the political punch which
radical history carried a decade ago. With their focus often
on microstudi.es, and with their tendency to be suspicious of
schematizing and generalization, present-day radical histori-
ans are often less overtly concerned than the previous genera-
tion was to identify and hammer away at the ideological props,
such as mfecane-theory, which help sustain the current racial
and social order in South Africa.
Conclusion
A hundred and sixty years after it first surfaced, the
devastation stereotype lives on, embedded now in mfecane-
theory. Cape merchant interests created it in the 1820s and
1830s on the basis of hearsay evidence. Natal settlers from
the 1840s onward, the first South Africanists in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, and Afrikaner nationalist historians
from the early 20th century onward all had a common vested in-
terest in keeping it alive. Early liberal historians in South
Africa, with their attentions elsewhere, incorporated it as an
element in what they saw as the not very important history of
the country's African underclasses. Later liberal historians,
first outside and then inside South Africa, helped resuscitate
and reconstruct it in a way that would be aceptable to emerg-
ing African nationalist elites. After a brief period of con-
cern with developing new approaches both to pre-industrial
history and to the macrohistory of southern Africa, the major-
ity of radical historians turned away towards the more recent
past and towards a partially depoliticized social history,
leaving the stereotype intact. Present-day writers of all
shades of opinion continue to pick it up from the previous
literature and to incorporate it into their own work without
attempting to seek empirical verification for it. Natal's
mfecane exists today by virtue not of historical argumentation
but of uncritical repetition of a racist and elitist myth.
